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Recently, large-scale cascading failures in complex systems have garnered substantial attention.
Such extreme events have been treated as an integral part of the self-organized criticality (SOC).
Recent empirical work has suggested that some extreme events systematically deviate from the SOC
paradigm, requiring a different theoretical framework. We shed additional theoretical light on this
possibility by studying financial crisis. We build our model of financial crisis on the well-known
forest fire model in scale-free networks. Our analysis shows a non-trivial scaling feature indicating
supercritical behavior, which is independent of system size. Extreme events in the supercritical
state result from bursting of a fat bubble, seeds of which are sown by a protracted period of a
benign financial environment with few shocks. Our findings suggest that policymakers can control
the magnitude of financial meltdowns by keeping the economy operating within reasonable duration
of a benign environment.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.65.Gh
Large-scale cascading failures have garnered attention
in many complex systems, such as power grids and com-
munication networks [1–4], because once they happen,
their impact can be unexpectedly catastrophic. A case in
point is the crippling blow to the world economy preceded
by the failure of an investment bank, Lehman Brothers,
and the subsequent financial meltdown with the evapo-
ration of more than $10 trillion from the global equity
market [5]. In the past, such an extreme event was
treated as an integral part of the self-organized critical-
ity [6–8], which is characterized by a power-law distri-
bution. Partly due to the scarcity of extreme events, few
suspected the possibility that some of them could sys-
tematically deviate from a power-law distribution. Re-
cently, however, researchers have begun to consider ex-
treme events as supercritical phenomena, characterizing
extreme events as distinguishable by their sizes from the
rest of the statistical population [9, 10]. The objective of
our work is to shed additional light on such supercritical
behavior by studying financial meltdown.
We build our model of financial crisis on the existing
forest fire (FF) model introduced by Drossel and Schw-
abl [11–13], because it captures two essential features
in financial meltdown. First, its non-conservative ingre-
dient naturally mimics financial meltdown, where asset
prices tend not to be conserved. When an asset market
collapses, traders have difficulty pricing assets, as was
the case in the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities
market on the eve of the 2008 Financial Crisis. The as-
sets that were previously considered liquid become illiq-
uid, causing chronic problems for banks with speculative
bets on these assets. The upshot is that an important
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quantity, the value of assets, will not be conserved over
time. Second, there exists a separation of two time scales.
It takes a long time for banks to build up a fat bubble,
which is represented by a percolation cluster consisting
of counterparties of vulnerable banks that make specu-
lative bets on risky assets. In contrast, the meltdown of
this cluster takes place very quickly as trees burn up in
a short time.
Here, we model the FF dynamics in scale-free net-
works, which are employed to capture entangled coun-
terparty relationships among banks worldwide. For ex-
ample, on the eve of the 2008 financial crisis, Lehman
alone was counterparty to almost a million derivatives
contracts and a huge borrower in the repo market, and
its zillions of derivative and repo contracts connected the
bank to numerous counterparties all over the world [14].
Our analysis shows a non-trivial scaling feature indicat-
ing supercritical behavior, which is independent of sys-
tem size. Prior research on the FF model did not de-
tect this supercritical behavior [11, 15–17]. We are able
to detect it because it becomes more pronounced and
conspicuous in scale-free networks, where the percolation
threshold vanishes when the degree exponent is between
two and three.
Model: Building on [11], we model the contagion of
financial crisis through an inter-banking network of size
N , which is represented by a scale-free network with the
degree distribution Pd(k) ∼ k
−γ [18, 19]. It is known
to be ubiquitous, and empirical research suggests that an
inter-banking network can be approximated by a scale-
free network [20, 21]. In the inter-banking network, each
node represents a bank or bank-like firm, whereas a link
between two nodes represents a counterparty relation-
ship. A bank may lend money to its counterpart bank
or invest in its financial products or assets. When one
bank defaults on some debt, this event can leave its coun-
2FIG. 1. (Color online) (A) A schematic illustration of the model. i) Empty (filled) nodes represent healthy (vulnerable) banks.
ii) A randomly chosen healthy bank becomes vulnerable by taking excessive risks, and a cluster develops composed of four
connected vulnerable banks. iii) One of the banks in the cluster is exposed to a random shock (represented as lightning), the
exposed bank fails, and a cascade of bank failures is triggered throughout the entire cluster. iv) Those failed nodes become
healthy. The number of failed banks in iii) is avalanche size. (B) A typical sequence of the avalanche sizes in a network with
105 banks. Most avalanches are small, but a large-scale financial meltdown does occur as shown at time step 600. (C) The
cluster size distribution of inter-connected vulnerable banks at an onset of a large-scale financial meltdown. There exists a
giant cluster (arrow), where complex transactional relationships among banks in vulnerable state will serve as a channel for
financial crisis contagion.
terpart creditors or investors dangerously short of funds.
To shed some meaningful light on the dynamics of such
a complex system, our model focuses only on cascading
bank failures in the inter-banking network. Defaults of
non-financial firms or individuals are treated as external
shocks to the system.
The dynamics of the FF model in the inter-banking
network is defined as follows: Each node can be in one of
the two states: vulnerable or healthy, which corresponds
to a tree-occupied state or an empty state. In the vul-
nerable state, the node has insufficient cash reserves and
is susceptible to financial shock. In the healthy state,
the bank has enough cash or liquid assets on hand to
meet depositors’ (or creditors’) demands, and is resilient
to financial shocks. Initially all nodes are healthy, and
the following steps are repeated: i) a randomly chosen
node becomes vulnerable; ii) a randomly chosen node
experiences a shock with a probability of 1/θ. If the
chosen node is vulnerable, the whole cluster of vulnera-
ble nodes containing the chosen node fails, and all the
failed nodes become healthy. This approach to model-
ing of financial contagion differs from typical epidemic
models, where healthy individuals are susceptible to in-
fection from infected individuals. Actually such contact
processes are supposed to exist but are ignored in the
FF model because their time scale is too short compared
with that of growing trees. We call the number of nodes
in the failed cluster the avalanche size. The probability
distribution of avalanche sizes, which is denoted as Ps(s),
is our primary interest (Fig. 1 A,B).
Implication to financial systems: The parameter θ con-
trols the average duration between two successive ex-
ternal shocks (two successive instances of lightening in
the context of forest fire), which may be interpreted as
the availability of liquidity in a financial system. In the
model, the extreme events result from bursting of bub-
bles, seeds of which are sown by economic expansion with
few shocks for a long period, which corresponds to the
case when θ is large. That is, as banks do not experi-
ence defaults on their loans, more and more banks get
involved in transactions of risky assets with many other
counterparties, building up an extremely fat bubble. His-
torically, the fragility of the financial system has been in-
creased by long periods of easy access to money, during
which defaults on loans were infrequent [22, 23].
After the expansion with easy money, the moment ar-
rives for a dramatic reversal of the expansion−this is now
known as a Minsky moment in the financial community
[24, 25]. Usually an external shock, such as sudden in-
creases in interest rates, acts as a wakeup call of a finan-
cial meltdown. Assets that were previously considered
liquid become illiquid and values of risky assets are heav-
ily devaluated. Banks with imprudent practices can no
longer borrow money from the inter-banking money mar-
ket at a reasonable cost and fail. The devaluation and
the propagation of failures induce each other amplifying
the meltdown [22, 24–26]. On the other hand, in the FF
model, there are no locally conserved “carriers” of vul-
nerability such as sand grains in the sandpile model [6].
The failure of a node simply causes failures of all vulner-
able nodes connected to the failed node. This is a sim-
plified version of the real situation in which vulnerability
is amplified by the collapse of asset markets and the sub-
sequent evaporation of liquidity. The non-conservative
nature of the FF model is an essential ingredient for the
supercritical behavior because conventional conservative
avalanche models such as sandpile model do not exhibit
supercriticality in regular lattices or scale-free networks
[27].
In the FF model, the separation of two time scales,
3FIG. 2. (Color online) (A) Probability distributions of
avalanche sizes for various q. The tails of the distributions
systematically deviate from a power-law behavior. (B) Prob-
ability distributions of avalanche sizes for various degree ex-
ponent values γ. Simulations were run on scale-free networks
with exponent γ = 2.5 for (A), containing N = 107 nodes and
L = 10N links for (A) and (B).
the periods of expansion and meltdown, seems to be rea-
sonable for modeling financial crisis. After the Minsky
moment, a failure of one vulnerable bank tends to trig-
ger a financial meltdown. Since the timescale for such a
meltdown in reality is much smaller than that for expan-
sion [5], we describe a financial meltdown as a series of
bank failures occurring in one time step.
In the next time step, the failed nodes become healthy
again. An interpretation of this rule is that the failed
banks are refinanced through government bailouts or ac-
quisitions by other actors. In reality, failed banks may
also be dissolved, or new banks may enter the system, and
the bank network evolves. However, after a transient pe-
riod of the evolution which is rather short compared with
the interval between two successive financial crises, the
network should be still scale-free and have similar statis-
tical properties with the previous one. Thus, statistical
properties of the FF model on such dynamic networks
can be obtained by repeated simulations in an ensemble
of scale-free networks.
Avalanche size distribution: The simulation results of
Ps(s) for various q ≡ θ/N are shown in Fig. 2A. They
show that a parameter q, the availability of liquidity rel-
ative to the system size, positively affects the magnitude
FIG. 3. (Color online) (A) Plot of data collapse in small-size
avalanche region and (B) intermediate-size avalanche region
for different system sizes N . The parameter q is fixed as
10−4. The underlying networks are scale-free networks with
degree exponent γ = 2.5. (A) indicates the crossover point
sc1 between the first and second region scales as N
0.53 and
(B) indicates the other crossover point sc2 between the second
region and third region scales as N .
of the large-scale financial meltdown. When q is suf-
ficiently small, the size distribution decays in a power
law-like manner. In this case, external shocks are fre-
quent, small-scale avalanches are more likely, and large-
scale avalanches are less likely. In contrast, when q is
large, the distribution exhibits a supercritical behavior
and can be characterized in three distinct regions: i) in
the first region, the size distribution decays at a rate close
to a power-law; ii) in the second region, a bump exists
whose pattern can be described by an increasing power-
law function, called the supercritical region; iii) in the
third region, the distribution tails off sharply.
In the model, a protracted period without shock al-
lows the development of bubbles, which are represented
by a giant cluster of complex transactional relationships
among vulnerable banks. This is equivalent to the giant
cluster in a percolation theory [28] (Fig. 1C). The fail-
ure of one bank in a giant cluster causes the failure of
the whole cluster. It is a large-scale financial meltdown
in the model. The size distribution in the first region is
due to the failures of banks in finite-sized clusters as well
as giant clusters, whereas the distribution in the second
region stems from the failures of banks in giant clusters
4only.
We examine the sensitivity of our key findings to a
change in the degree exponent γ, which controls the de-
grees of mega banks. For all levels of γ from 2.1 to
5, supercritical behavior is apparent (Fig. 2B). We also
run simulations on regular lattics, in which mega banks
are outright absent. Supercritical behavior also appears
when q is sufficiently large, which will be shown later.
This result shows that the absence of mega banks does
not eliminate the possibility of a supercritical financial
meltdown completely if q is large. Indeed, history sug-
gests that large-scale financial meltdowns did occur in
pre-modern eras prior to the evolution of modern mega
banks [22, 29, 30].
Finite-size scaling of supercritical behavior: A bump in
an avalanche size distribution is found in many systems.
Such bumps are usually believed to be a finite-size effect
that vanishes in the thermodynamic limit, manifesting
critical behavior. However, the bump in our avalanche
size distribution is qualitatively different in that it sus-
tains in the thermodynamic limit, implying genuine su-
percritical behavior. Furthermore, the bump exhibits the
increasing power-law behavior, which has not been ob-
served in other avalanche dynamics to our knowledge.
Here we systematically analyze these observations based
on a finite-size scaling analysis of the avalanche size dis-
tribution.
We first denote the crossover point between the first
and second regions as sc1. In Fig. 3, we show that the
aforementioned behavior is observed in systems of differ-
ent sizes, but the crossover point depends on the system
size in a power-law manner (i.e., sc1 ∼ N
µ). Based on
this result, we make the usual scaling ansatz:
P (<)s (s) = c1G<(s/sc1). (1)
The scaling function G<(x) behaves as G<(x) ∼ x
−τ for
x < 1. To eliminate the size dependency, c1 is determined
as c1 ∼ N
−µτ .
The crossover point between the second and the third
regions is denoted as sc2. To characterize the scaling
behavior in the bump pattern for different system sizes,
we introduce another scaling hypothesis:
P (>)s (s) = c2G>(s/sc2) (2)
where sc2 ∼ N , because sc2 represents a massive-scale
avalanche comparable to the system size in order of mag-
nitude (Fig. 3B). Then the scaling function behaves as
G>(x) ∼ x
ζ for x < 1 and sharply decays for x > 1.
Because the two avalanche size distribution functions are
continuous at sc1, the coefficient c2 must depend on the
system size as c2 ∼ N
ζ−µ(τ+ζ).
We numerically confirm the scaling behavior using the
data collapse procedure. The scaling hypothesis implies
that curves N−µτP
(<)
s (s/Nµ) for different N should col-
lapse into the same curve in the first region, and that
the collapsing part extends as N grows. Similarly, the
curves N−ζ+µ(τ+ζ)P
(>)
s (s/N) for different N should col-
lapse into the same curve in the second region. This
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Average density of vulnerable nodes
as a function of q. The density is measured just before each
shock. Degree exponent of the underlying network is taken
as γ = 2.5. The scaling behavior is evident in the range of q
where the plateau is observed in the average density.
data collapse is well established by the choice of τ = 2.55,
µ = 0.53, and ζ = 0.75 for networks with γ = 2.5 (Fig. 3).
The chosen exponents do not depend on q, but on γ (Ta-
ble. ). Thus, the scaling behavior is independent of the
parameter q. It depends only on the topology of the un-
derlying network.
A scaling relation between the exponents τ , µ, and ζ
is obtained by considering the average size of avalanches
〈s〉. For a duration ∆t, the average number of avalanches
is given by ρ∆t/qN , where ρ is the density of the vulnera-
ble banks in the steady state. Then, the average number
of failed banks in the duration is 〈s〉 ρ∆t/qN . This must
be equal to the average number of banks (1− ρ)∆t that
become vulnerable in the duration because the number
of vulnerable banks in the system is steady on average.
Thus, we obtain 〈s〉 = qN(1 − ρ)/ρ [11]. On the other
hand, we have 〈s〉 =
∫ sc1
1
sP
(<)
s (s)ds+
∫∞
sc1
sP
(>)
s (s)ds ∼
N ζ−µ(τ+ζ)+2. Thus, the relation µ(τ + ζ) − ζ = 1 is
obtained. Our measurement of the exponents in the sim-
ulations also fits the relation well. This relation implies
that the second region is sustained in the thermodynamic
limit because the probability of the avalanches in the re-
gion is constant as
∫ sc2
sc1
P (>)s (s)ds ∼ N
ζ−µ(τ+ζ)+1 ∼ const. (3)
The range of q in which the scaling behavior holds
can be estimated by the average density of vulnerable
nodes measured just before each shock. We find that
there exists a range of q in which the average density
measured just before each shock is independent of q. The
scaling behavior holds in the range, whereas deviation is
observed outside the range (Fig. 4). A finite upper bound
q0 (≈ 10
−4) of the range exists, but the lower bound
seems to vanish as the system size increases. For any
0 < q < q0, the scaling behavior holds if the system size
is large enough. The vanishing lower bound is supported
by the fact that the percolation threshold vanishes in
5FIG. 5. (Color online) Data collapse of the avalanche size
distributions on two dimensional square lattices of different
sizes for a fixed q = 0.7. The linear size of a lattice is denoted
as L. The collapse of the decreasing part indicates that the
crossover point scales as L1.9. The inset shows the cutoff point
of the increasing part scales along the order of the system size
L2.
scale-free networks with 2 < γ < 3 [28]. The density of
vulnerable nodes is always higher than the percolation
threshold, implying a supercritical giant cluster exists in
the thermodynamic limit.
We have two divergent size scales sc1 and sc2 in the
model. The scaling of sc2 of the order of N is clear, but
scaling of the crossover point sc1 is not trivial. To under-
stand the characteristics of the exponent µ, we simulate
the model on the two dimensional square lattice. When
q is sufficiently large, a bump again appears in the tail
of the distribution (Fig. 5). We find that the crossover
points scale as sc1 ∼ L
1.9 and sc2 ∼ L
2, where L is the
linear size of the system andN = L2. The value 1.9 of the
exponent sc1 is close to the fractal dimension of the per-
colating cluster around the percolation threshold on the
lattice. The scaling is expected because sc1 is the starting
point of the bump and thus represents the typical size of
small giant clusters. The existence of the bump and the
cutoff of the order of N are also expected if the density of
vulnerable nodes is maintained to be larger than the per-
colation threshold by sufficiently large q. However, the
bump is too narrow to exhibit any power-law behavior.
Therefore, the arguments we made for the FF model on
scale-free networks will not be directly applicable to the
bump in the lattice. We remark that in a previous study
[15], a similar distribution was observed and was inter-
pretted as a violation of simple finite-size scaling ansatz,
but no scaling analysis for sc1 was provided.
Discussion: We have studied the FF model on scale-
γ 2.1 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0
τ 2.8 2.55 2.4 2.0 1.98
µ 0.5 0.53 0.55 0.65 0.67
ζ 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.9 1.0
TABLE I. Dependency of the scaling exponents on the degree
exponent γ of the underlying scale-free networks.
free networks and derived a scaling relation for the
avalanche sizes in the supercritical region, which implies
that the supercritical dynamics can occur generically, in-
dependent of system size. In particular, the dynamics
of our model generate not only small-scale bank failures
but also extremely large-scale financial meltdowns. The
dynamics are shaped by the formation of a bubble, which
is represented by a cluster of counterparty relationships
among vulnerable banks that make speculative bets on
risky assets.
The size of a bubble is controlled by the duration in
which the system is not exposed to external shocks (e.g.,
no lightening in the context of forest fire). When the du-
ration is short, small-scale bank failures are more likely,
but the possibility for an extreme financial meltdown is
reduced. When the duration is long enough, however,
small-scale bank failures become less frequent, as is usu-
ally the case in an era of easy access to money. History,
however, suggests that a protracted era of easy money
promotes imprudent banking practices and development
of speculative bubbles [22, 23, 31]. In our model, the
system evolves to a supercritical state in this munificent
environment, increasing the likelihood of development of
an unusually large cluster of counterparty relationships
among vulnerable banks with speculative bets on risky
assets. This cluster is equivalent to a supercritical perco-
lation cluster in the context of forest fire. When one bank
in this cluster fails, other counterparties in the cluster are
affected, and cascading bank failures occur.
This is reminiscent of the financial meltdown triggered
by the demise of Lehman Brothers, which was acting
as the prime broker for many hedge funds in execut-
ing trades, holding collateral, receiving, and disbursing
monies [14]. Lehman’s failure immediately wiped out
plenty of hedge funds. The bankruptcy of Lehman’s Eu-
ropean subsidiary alone froze $40 billion in clients funds
[32]. Furthermore, its biggest counterparties, such as
Bank of America, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank, were
critically affected and eventually bailed out by govern-
ments. Then, a credit crunch hammered banking systems
globally, and the shutdown of some asset markets made
it difficult to conserve the value of an asset. It became
blatantly obvious that this non-conservative nature is one
of the essential features of financial crisis. Our findings
highlight the importance of policy interventions in keep-
ing the economy operating within reasonable duration of
easy money regime, which seems to be one of the root
causes of large-scale financial meltdowns.
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